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Abstract – A reliability assessment framework is developed 
for small scale Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. The analysis 
considers several candidate architectures with different 
numbers of servos and controllable surfaces. It is assumed 
that servo faults can be detected with some rate of false 
alarm and missed detection. The flight envelope is analyzed 
to determine the fault levels for which it remains possible to 
control the aircraft. For these “flyable” fault levels, it is 
assumed that the flight control law can be reconfigured to 
safely land the aircraft. Finally, the estimate of the aircraft 
catastrophic failure rate is based on the histogram of (pre-
fault) control command distributions, mean time between 
failure of the individual servos, missed detection rates for 
built-in tests, and false alarms. The analysis results provide 
clear trade-offs between these various parameters as well as 
the number and configuration of the servos. 
Keywords: UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES, RELIABILITY 
ASSESSMENT, FLIGHT CONTROL ARCHITECTURE 
1. Introduction 
The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) industry is undergoing 
a rapid transformation due to the emergence of several 
commercial applications, projected to surpass military 
spending in the coming years [5].  The rapid growth period of 
the past years, mainly driven by research and development 
(R&D) projects will fuel a second industrial boom, the 
commercial and civil drone market is expected to develop 
strongly during the next few years and could reach 2 billion 
dollars by 2015, driven by new technological capabilities, 
lower production costs and changes to the regulatory 
framework. 
The main barrier for the widespread use of UAVs is their 
inability to routinely access the common airspace. This is due 
to a combination of regulatory and technical challenges. On 
the regulatory side, significant work is currently undertaken 
both in the US and in the EU to establish the framework for 
seamless integration into the national airspace. On the 
technical side there are a variety of issues including the need 
for sense & avoid technologies, secure communication and 
human factors. UAVs lack the operational experience of 
conventional aircraft, hence they pose a significant risk for air 
traffic and for the humans on the ground [19]. The U.S. 
Federal Aviation Administration has yet to propose rules to 
govern the use of commercial robotic aircraft in U.S. skies, 
but it predicts that 7,500 unmanned craft weighing 55 pounds 
(25 kilograms) or less will be operating in the U.S. by 2018. 
There is strong interest from agriculture, mining, and 
infrastructure companies in using drones in Europe also [3]. 
The remainder of this paper focuses on one specific technical 
issue: the design of a reliable UAV architecture, since 
reliability of most existing UAS is far below that required of 
manned commercial and manned military aircraft. The MQ-
1 Predator recorded an accident rate of 13.7 for every 
100,000 hours for its first 10 years of operation, the MQ-9 
Reaper has fared better than the Predator, partially thanks to 
its triple redundant flight control system and the more 
rigorous systems engineering approach behind it, incurring 
3.17 mishaps per 100,000 hours which is getting close to the 
mishap rate of the two fighter jets, the F-16 and F-15, which 
have posted mishap rates of 1.96 and 1.47 respectively [19]. 
On the other hand, improving the reliability of commercial 
UAS will be difficult because payload and economic 
considerations prevent the use of triplex redundancy (the 
standard design technique used to achieve high reliability in 
safety critical aerospace systems [15]). In fact, most 
commercial UAS on the market [14] fly with single string 
avionics and use only two actuator surfaces. To raise the 
reliability of small commercial UAS some level of 
redundancy will be required both on the avionics side by the 
mean of fault tolerant control, and also on the aerodynamics 
side, using physically redundant flight control surfaces. 
The present article provides an approach on designing and 
assessing the overall reliability of these small, and affordable 
UAVs to help understanding the inherent design trade-offs in 
systems engineering. The main challenge is to combine 
hardware redundancy with analytical redundancy based fault 
tolerant control, which provides the required reliability at the 
lowest cost and system weight/complexity. The control 
system layout, control design assumptions and the flight 
control surface architecture influenced by faults are 
considered within this article. Clear trade-offs are established 
between possible tolerable faults, the layout of flight control 
surfaces and the overall reliability of various candidate UAV 
architectures. 
2.  Problem Formulation 
Based on the motivations in the previous section, a method is 
proposed to assess the reliability of various UAV actuator 
architectures without the need for extensive flight testing. The 
proposed method is of general nature and can be applied to 
any UAV. However a specific small UAV (BALDR) is used 
as a concrete example for the reliability calculations. BALDR 
 
  
 
is a small UAV, based on the Ultra Stick 120 airframe, that is 
maintained by the university of Minnesota, [16]. A simulation 
environment is available for this UAV. The centerpiece of the 
environment is the high-fidelity nonlinear six degrees-of-
freedom model of the Ultra Stick 120 aircraft. The 
aerodynamic parameters in this model were estimated based 
on wind tunnel tests conducted at the NASA Langley 
Research Center [13,7]. The simulation environment and the 
flight control computer allow for extensive software-in-the-
loop and processor-in-the-loop simulations of the aircraft 
model. The entire simulation environment, details about the 
aircraft fleet, components, wiring, and data from numerous 
flight tests have been made open-source and can be freely 
downloaded from this website: [16]. 
   
Figure  1: The BALDR UAV with the control surfaces 
labeled (A – aileron, F – flap, E – elevator, R – rudder). 
   
   
Figure  2: Tail of the BALDR UAV with the control 
surfaces labeled (E – elevator, R – rudder). 
 The goal of the current study is to assess the impact of 
various actuator architectures on the overall system 
reliability. The overall system reliability can be quantified via 
the probability of catastrophic failure of the aircraft. In this 
study, catastrophic failure is defined as the inability of the 
aircraft to reach a proper landing site. The failure rate of the 
actuators is much greater than the other units due to the wear 
of the moving parts. They usually make up more than half of 
the components in number, so they can be considered the 
greatest contributor to the overall reliability of a UAV. In case 
of an actuator failure a path must be generated from any 
starting point to the landing site, which requires, at the 
minimum, the ability to fly straight with a constant altitude, 
turn with a maximum specified turning radius (at constant 
altitude) and descend with a minimum specified flight path 
angle. These requirements can be presented as a minimal 
flight envelope in the flight path angle – heading rate (𝛾 – ?̇?) 
plane. This minimal flight envelope is explained in detail in 
section 4. 
This paper only considers faults in the servos of the aircraft. 
Engine failure is not considered because of the assumption 
that the aircraft can glide to a safe landing. There are several 
servo failure modes such as jamming, runaway, loss of 
efficiency, disconnection and oscillatory [6]. The last three 
failure modes are more common in large aircrafts where 
larger loads are present and resonance can occur because of 
the aeroelastic behaviour of the airframe. Jamming and 
runaway failures can occur in small aircrafts and can lead to 
catastrophic failures. Runaway failures are considered an 
extreme case of jamming at the physical limits. In this paper, 
only jam faults of the control surface is considered in the 
reliability assessment. 
The BALDR has eight unique aerodynamic control surfaces: 
split elevators (𝐸1, 𝐸2), split rudders (𝑅1, 𝑅2), ailerons 
(𝐴1, 𝐴2), and flaps (𝐹1, 𝐹2). These control surfaces are 
shown in figures 1 and 2. Each of the eight aerodynamic 
control surfaces is actuated by an independent servo motor. 
Different combinations of the eight surfaces allow for 
different actuator architectures to be defined. The sign 
convention of the control surfaces is as follows. A trailing 
edge down deflection of the elevators, ailerons, and flaps is 
considered positive. A trailing edge left deflection of the 
rudders is considered positive. In addition, all the surfaces 
have a deflection range [−25∘, +25∘]. Increasing the number 
of servos on an aircraft increases reliability, if the architecture 
is properly designed, but it also adds to the cost and weight 
of the system. To analyze this trade-off, five actuator 
architectures are defined below for the BALDR aircraft for 
which the probability of catastrophic failure is estimated in 
section 5.   
 
    • coupled ailerons, single elevator, single rudder, coupled 
flaps (4 servos)  
    • decoupled ailerons, single elevator, single rudder, no 
flaps (4 servos)  
    • coupled ailerons, split elevators, single rudder, no flaps 
(4 servos)  
    • coupled ailerons, single elevator, single rudder, no flaps 
(3 servos)  
    • decoupled ailerons, single elevator, no rudder, no flaps (3 
servos)  
 
These configurations will hereafter be referred to as v0, …, 
  
 
v4. The configuration v0 is only used for flight envelope 
assessment in section 4. The eight different control surfaces 
of the BALDR are coupled differently depending on the 
actuator configuration. As an example, for the v0 
configuration, 𝐴1 = −𝐴2, 𝐸1 = 𝐸2, 𝑅1 = 𝑅2, and 𝐹1 =
𝐹2. 
There are several simplifying assumptions to make the 
analysis tractable in the early design phase. First, it is 
assumed that a Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) algorithm 
is used to detect actuator faults. Simple bulit-in-tests and 
model based methods are both considered as parts of the FDI 
algorithm. However, only statistical properties of the FDI like 
missed detection and false alarm rates are considered. 
Dynamic properties like detection time are neglected at this 
point. It is also assumed that, if the aircraft is trimmable after 
a fault has occurred, an appropriate reconfigurable control 
law is available. In other words, transitions between trim 
points are without loss of control. Only single faults are 
considered as multiple faults occurring at the same time have 
negligible probabilities. Another assumption is that the 
deflection of a control surface is independent of time, which 
enables us to use independent and identically distributed 
probability density functions in the calculations. The high 
fidelity nonlinear simulation of the BALDR allows for the 
determination of trim points. The failure probability 
calculation requires the knowledge of the reliability of a 
single servo (usually expressed by the Mean Time Between 
Failure – MTBF). 
The analysis method has three distinct steps:   
    • acquiring control surface distributions  
    • determining flight envelopes and stuck surface ranges  
    • estimating the probability of catastrophic failure  
 The probability distributions of control surface deflections 
are used to compute the probability of a surface being stuck 
in the range where faults cannot be tolerated. The ranges for 
each surface are determined by discovering the allowable 
trim points or actuator jamming faults. The probability of 
catastrophic failure is then estimated by summing the 
probabilities of the various surfaces being stuck in the range 
where faults cannot be tolerated. 
3.  Distribution of Control Signals 
Determining the distribution of the aircraft’s control signals 
is needed for the evaluation of the final probability of failure. 
These distribution functions are influenced by several factors, 
including the mission profile, the control algorithm and 
exogenous disturbances (sensor noise, wind gusts and 
atmospheric turbulence). Control algorithms play a large part 
in forming the distributions and therefore in the reliability of 
a UAV. As an example, using the rudder for coordinated turns 
or simply yaw rate damping results in different control signal 
characteristics. Controller dynamics also affect the shape of 
the distributions. A conservative controller yields small 
variance around the trim point, while a more agile controller 
results in the deflections more spread out. 
  
Figure  3: Aircraft path during area scanning mission. 
   
   
Figure  4: Control surface distributions during line segment 
following. 
   
   
Figure  5: Control surface distributions during circular orbit 
following (right turns only). 
   
Histograms of control surface deflections can be plotted from 
flight data or simulations, then probability density functions 
can be estimated for these histograms. Generating the 
histograms directly from measurements may not always be 
practical because it would require flight tests for every 
mission profile considered. The mission profile, in fact, can 
be broken down into different elements like straight-level 
flight, banked turns and steady ascents and descents. If the 
distributions of the control signals are known for these 
modes, the overall distributions can be constructed by 
combining them with weighting that accounts for the 
probability of being in each mode during the mission:  
 𝑝𝑖(𝛿) = 𝑝𝑖(𝛿|𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒 = 1)𝑝(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒 = 1) + ⋯ 
  
 
 +𝑝𝑖(𝛿|𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒 = 𝑛)𝑝(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒 = 𝑛),           (1) 
 where 𝑝𝑖(𝛿|𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒 = 𝑛) is the probability distribution 
function of the 𝑖th control surface during mode 𝑛 and 
𝑝(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒 = 𝑛) is the probability of being in mode 𝑛. This way 
histograms obtained from one mission profile can be used to 
generate histograms for another one and the effect of different 
profiles on UAV reliability can be evaluated. 
Figure 3 shows a typical area scanning path for the BALDR 
UAV obtained from the Software-in-the-Loop simulation 
(duration is 588 s). It consists of three modes: straight level 
flight and left and right banked turns. Figures 4 and 5 show 
the distributions of the control surfaces for two phases of the 
mission. Normal distributions are fitted to ailerons and 
elevators as they are approximately Gaussian while rudder 
distributions appear to be multi-modal and cannot be 
characterized easily. Aileron trim values are near zero 
degrees: the small mean is used to compensate for motor 
torque. In addition, the mean aileron deflection during a 
banked turn is also near zero, as shown by figure 5. This is 
because a large aileron deflection is only required to 
transition to a banked turn; once the desired roll angle is 
achieved, the ailerons return to their small trim value. On the 
other hand, the elevator trim is affected by the turn to produce 
more lift, as can be seen by a change of 1.03 degrees. The 
variances of the distributions are somewhat greater in the 
turns. Rudder distributions are different in the two modes: for 
the straight flight they are symmetrical but for the turn one of 
the side lobes is missing. The reason for this is that only right 
turns were used to generate the histograms while the straight 
flight contained both positive and negative rudder deflections 
for disturbance rejection. 
The probability of being in each mode is estimated from the 
mission profile as the fraction of time spent in that mode. For 
the area scanning mission the probabilities of the modes can 
be calculated from the geometry of the scanned area and the 
distance between the scanning lines. For the path shown in 
figure 3 the waypoints are 1000 m apart in the North and 200 
m apart in the East direction. The resulting probabilities are 
0.13 for both left and right turns and 0.74 for straight flight. 
4.  Flight Envelope Assessment 
 This section gives a cursory introduction to aircraft flight 
envelopes, since this concept is important for the subsequent 
section. The aircraft equations of motion [11, 2],  can be 
described in the nonlinear state-space form as shown in 
equations (2) and (3).  
 ?̇? = 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑢) (2) 
  𝑦 = ℎ(𝑥, 𝑢) (3) 
In these equations, 𝑥 ∈ ℝ𝑛 is the state vector, 𝑢 ∈ ℝ𝑚 is the 
input vector, and 𝑦 ∈ ℝ𝑝 is the output vector. In addition, 
𝑓: ℝ𝑛 × ℝ𝑚 → ℝ𝑛 is the state function and ℎ: ℝ𝑛 × ℝ𝑚 →
ℝ𝑝 is the output function. The state vector is: 𝑥 =
[𝜙, 𝜃, 𝜓, 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤]𝑇. Here, 𝜙, 𝜃, and 𝜓 are the Euler 
angles of the aircraft. The aircraft’s angular velocity 
components in the body-fixed frame are: roll rate (𝑝), pitch 
rate (𝑞), and yaw rate (𝑟). The airspeed components in the 
body-fixed frame are 𝑢, 𝑣, and 𝑤. We also define a reduced 
order state vector that does not contain 𝜓: 𝑥𝑟 =
[𝜙, 𝜃, 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤]𝑇. 𝑥𝑟  is used in the definitions of the 
flight envelopes. 
For configuration v0, there are only four unique aerodynamic 
inputs. In addition, the throttle for the motor is 𝜏. 
Consequently, the input vector is 𝑢 = [𝜏, 𝐸, 𝑅, 𝐴, 𝐹]. As 
expected, the input vector will change appropriately, 
depending on the actuator configuration. The studies 
conducted in this paper make use of certain elements in the 
output vector (𝑦). The airspeed, angle of attack, and angle of 
sideslip are denoted by 𝑉, 𝛼, and 𝛽, respectively. The flight 
path climb angle and heading rate are denoted by 𝛾 and ?̇?, 
respectively. 
Aircraft typically fly around equilibrium or trim points. These 
are operating points at which some state derivatives are zero, 
and others have constant values. The collection of all such 
trim points defines the steady flight envelope (𝔽) of the 
aircraft, as shown in equation (4).  
𝔽 = {(?̅?, ?̅?): ?̇̅?𝑟 = 0, ?̇̅? = 0} (4) 
A subset of the flight envelope is straight and level flight, i.e. 
unaccelerated flight at constant altitude. This subset is 
mathematically described in equation (5). The key property 
of this subset is the zero flight path angle (?̅? = 0).  
𝔽𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡,𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = {(?̅?, ?̅?): 𝑓(?̅?, ?̅?) = 0, ?̅? = ?̅? = ?̅? = 0, 
?̅? = 0, ?̇̅? = 0} (5) 
Level flight is, by definition, at constant altitude. When the 
aircraft descends steadily, at a constant negative flight path 
angle (?̅? < 0), the envelope is described by equation (6).  
𝔽𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦,𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 = {(?̅?, ?̅?): 𝑓(?̅?, ?̅?) = 0, ?̅? = ?̅? = ?̅? = 0, 
?̅? < 0, ?̇̅? = 0} (6) 
Another subset of the flight envelope is steady banked turns 
at constant altitude. A steady banked turn is defined by a 
constant heading rate (?̇?). Left banked turns are described by 
a negative ?̇? and right banked turns are described by a 
positive ?̇?. These subsets are mathematically defined in 
equations (7) and (8).  
𝔽𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑,𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 = {(?̅?, ?̅?): ?̇̅?𝑟 = 0, ?̇? < 0, ?̅? = 0, ?̇̅? = 0} (7) 
𝔽𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑,𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = {(?̅?, ?̅?): ?̇̅?𝑟 = 0, ?̇? > 0, ?̅? = 0, ?̇̅? = 0} (8) 
These subsets can be computed by applying numerical 
optimization techniques to the nonlinear aircraft model that 
was introduced in section 2. The nonlinear aircraft model can 
be trimmed and linearized, using routines developed in-
house, at any operating point within the flight envelope. For 
straight & level flight, operating points are best expressed as 
pairs of (𝑉, 𝛼). A rectangular grid of such (𝑉, 𝛼) pairs is 
generated for 𝑉 ∈ [10,40]𝑚/𝑠 and 𝛼 ∈ [0∘, 20∘]. The grid 
resolution is 0.1𝑚/𝑠 and 0. 1∘ for 𝑉 and 𝛼, respectively. The 
  
 
nominal flight condition for the BALDR is (𝑉, 𝛼) =
(23𝑚/𝑠, 4.72∘). The trim routine is called at each grid point 
after being initialized with the nominal flight condition. For a 
specific subset, the trim routine finds the minimum of a 
nonlinear, multi-variable cost function subject to the 
appropriate constraint (equations (5) – (8)). Matlab’s 
Optimization Toolbox contains the fmincon function that is 
well suited for this purpose. This optimization problem is 
non-convex and, in general, has multiple local minima. The 
fmincon function returns the minima that is closest to the 
initial condition. 
Paper [4] conducted a similar trim state discovery for another 
Ultra Stick 120 version. The work presented in this paper 
draws on the results and conclusions outlined in [4] and 
connects them to the probability of catastrophic failure in 
section 5. A more thorough treatment of aircraft flight 
envelopes can be found in [9, 20, 17]. 
A limited flight envelope assessment is presented only for 
configuration v0. The envelope corresponding to longitudinal 
straight & level flight can be used to determine the stuck 
ranges for the elevator and flaps. This envelope is shown in 
the 𝑉 × 𝛼 plane in figure 6 and in the 𝐹 × 𝐸 plane in figure 
7. Trim points are marked by colored crosses in both these 
figures. In figure 6, the trim points are colored based on the 
value of the flap deflection. There are several interesting 
observations. First, as expected, there is an inverse 
relationship between 𝑉 and 𝛼. Trim points at high airspeeds 
have low 𝛼 and vice-versa. Second, since a nonlinear aircraft 
model is being trimmed, the inputs and outputs are implicitly 
constrained. As a result, the flight envelope has well-defined 
boundaries, as seen in figure 6. 
The high speed boundary is a collection of trim points that 
define the highest achievable airspeeds and lowest achievable 
angles of attack. Conversely, at the stall boundary, the stall 
angle of attack (approximately 15∘) is reached at low 
airspeeds. The high speed and stall boundaries are due to 
output constraints. The other two boundaries are due to input 
saturation. The TE up flap boundary defines trim points for 
which flaps are deflected to −25∘ (trailing edge up). The TE 
down flap boundary defines trim points for which flaps are 
deflected to +25∘ (trailing edge down). It is interesting to 
note that within these boundaries, fixed flap deflections 
define isolines that follow the general shape of the envelope.  
Although this envelope is plotted for configuration v0, the 
envelopes for other configurations can be extracted by 
looking at certain isolines. As an example, consider 
configuration v3, where no flaps are used. The flight envelope 
for this configuration would simply be the green isoline for 
𝐹 = 0 shown in figure 6. 
In figure 7, the trim points are colored based on the value of 
𝛼. Three important conclusions can be drawn from this 
figure. Firstly, it is seen that trim points exist for the entire 
range of flap deflections, as shown by the TE up/down flap 
boundaries. Secondly, there are no trim points for a positively 
deflected elevator. This implies that if the elevator was to get 
stuck positively, the result would be a catastrophic failure of 
the aircraft. As an example, for configuration v3 (𝐹 = 0), 
trim points exist for the elevator range [−25∘, −4∘]. It is seen 
that, for any given flap deflection, the high speed boundary is 
reached when the elevator is deflected to its highest 
trimmable value. Conversely, the stall boundary is reached 
for the lowest trimmable value of the elevator. 
   
Figure  6: Longitudinal flight envelope in the 𝑉 × 𝛼 plane. 
   
   
Figure  7: Longitudinal flight envelope in the 𝐹 × 𝐸 plane. 
  A stuck surface fault is called allowable if the aircraft can 
safely fly home in the presence of this fault. In order to safely 
fly home, the aircraft should be able to execute some limited 
maneuvers. The flight envelope subsets, that were defined 
earlier, can be used to describe these limited maneuvers. The 
aircraft should be able to fly straight and level, execute either 
left or right banked turns with some minimum ?̇?, and descend 
steadily at some minimum 𝛾. These limited maneuvers 
together form the minimal flight envelope. This can be 
visualized in the 𝛾 – ?̇? plane, as shown in figure 8. It is 
reasoned that as long as the actual flight envelope, in the 
presence of a stuck fault, is larger than this minimal flight 
envelope, the aircraft can safely fly home. 
  
 
   
Figure  8: Minimal flight envelope 
    Config.   Elevator(s)   Rudder(s)   Aileron(s)  
v1   [-25,-1]   [-25,+25]   [-25,+25]  
v2   [-25,+25]   [-25,+25]   [-11,+12]  
v3   [-25,-4]   [-25,+25]   [-7,+10]  
v4   [-25,-1]   N/A   [-25,+25]  
 
Table  1: Allowable stuck surface ranges 
  
For this research, the maximum required turning radius is 87 
m. This value was selected because it is sufficiently larger 
than the minimum achievable turning radius of 54 m, while 
still allowing for reasonably large heading rates. At a nominal 
airspeed of 𝑉 = 20m/s, an 87 m turning radius corresponds 
to a heading rate of ±13∘/𝑠. The minimum required flight 
path angle is chosen as 𝛾 = −3∘ since this is representative 
of typical glide slopes. The four points shown in figure 8 
define two triangles: 𝔽𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙,𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡  and 𝔽𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙,𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 . 
Furthermore, it is assumed that if trim points exist at the 
vertices of either of these two triangles, trim points exist in 
all of the corresponding triangle. Hence, it is sufficient to 
check for the existence of trim points at the vertices of the 
two triangles. 
For any given stuck fault, in order to safely fly home, at least 
one trim point needs to be found in each of the subsets 
𝔽𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡,𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  and 𝔽𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦,𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡, and either of the subsets 
𝔽𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑,𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡  and 𝔽𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑,𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡. In other words, a stuck fault is 
called allowable if trim points can be found either in 
𝔽𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙,𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡  or 𝔽𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙,𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 . In checking for the existence 
of trim points, no explicit constraints (such as a zero sideslip 
angle requirement) are placed on 𝑉, 𝛼, and 𝛽. 
The following steps describe the calculation of the allowable 
stuck surface ranges. First, the trimmable range for each 
surface is calculated at each of the four points shown in figure 
8. Then, the intersection of these trimmable ranges is 
calculated between 𝔽𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡,𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 , 𝔽𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦,𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡, and 
𝔽𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑,𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 . This intersection is called the trimmable range 
for 𝔽𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙,𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 . In a similar way, the trimmable range for 
𝔽𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙,𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  is calculated. The union of 𝔽𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙,𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡  and 
𝔽𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙,𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  is defined as the allowable stuck surface range. 
The allowable stuck surface ranges for v1 through v4 are 
given in Table 0. For configurations that have a single 
elevator (v1, v3, v4), it is seen that the range is never positive, 
i.e. no trim points exist for positively stuck elevator. 
However, the allowable range is [−25∘, +25∘] when split 
elevators are present (v2). Another interesting observation is 
that stuck rudder faults can always be tolerated as long as no 
explicit constraints are placed on 𝛽. Lastly, decoupled 
ailerons (v1 and v4) have the full allowable range as 
compared to coupled ailerons (v2 and v3). The allowable 
stuck surface ranges presented here in conjunction with the 
distribution of control signals, presented in section 3, allow 
for the computation of the probability of catastrophic failure 
for each of the four configurations. 
5.  Probability of Catastrophic Failure 
   
Figure  9: System level failure as a tree of different events 
(MD – missed detection, TP – true positive, FA – false 
alarm, TN – true negative). 
The final step of the assessment is the calculation of the 
probability of catastrophic failure. It is computed as the sum 
of the probabilities of a control surface getting stuck outside 
its allowable range. In addition to this, the missed detection 
and false alarm events of the FDI algorithm can be included 
in the calculation on a probabilistic basis. These events can 
be illustrated in a fault tree (figure 9), which decomposes 
system level failure into lower-level events of the failure of 
the servo and the FDI algorithm’s decisions about the servo’s 
state. Events that lead to catastrophic failure are marked as 
red, ones that do not are marked with green. The events of 
missed detection and false alarm can be characterized with 
the conditional probabilities 𝑃𝑀𝐷 =
𝑃(𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑  𝑑𝑒𝑡.  |  𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜  𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒) and 𝑃𝐹𝐴 =
𝑃(𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒  𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚  |  𝑛𝑜  𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜  𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒). 
From the distribution functions obtained in section 3 the 
probability of a control surface being in a given range can be 
  
 
computed. The probability that the 𝑖th surface is outside the 
allowable range [𝑙𝑢] is given by:  
𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒,𝑖 = 𝑃(𝛿𝑖 > 𝑢 ∨ 𝛿𝑖 < 𝑙) = 1 − ∫
𝑢
𝑙
𝑝𝑖(𝛿𝑖)𝑑𝛿𝑖. (9) 
 The probability of the 𝑖th surface getting stuck outside the 
allowable range is obtained by multiplying this with the servo 
failure rate 𝑞 = 1/𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹. The total probability of 
catastrophic failures due to all possible actuator faults outside 
their allowable range is given by:  
𝑃𝑆𝑌𝑆 = ∑
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑞𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒,𝑖 , (10) 
 where 𝑁 is the number of control surfaces. 
Missed detections lead to catastrophic failure because the 
control algorithm cannot reconfigure to accommodate the 
fault, both when the fault is inside and outside the allowable 
range. The case when the fault is outside the range is already 
included in equation (10), so only servo faults inside the 
allowable range have to be considered:  
𝑃𝑆𝑌𝑆,𝑀𝐷 = 𝑃𝑆𝑌𝑆 + ∑
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑞(1 − 𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒,𝑖)𝑃𝑀𝐷 . (11) 
 In addition, it is assumed that false alarms lead to 
catastrophic failure only outside the allowable range, since 
assumed faults inside the range can be tolerated by the 
controller. False alarms that occur when the servo is outside 
the allowable range do not always lead to catastrophic failure. 
However, this assumption is made as it is more conservative 
and thus yields an upper bound on the failure rate. Since the 
false alarm probability has meaning only in case of there is 
no servo fault, the probability indicating this case must be 
included in its calculation:  
𝑃𝑆𝑌𝑆,𝑀𝐷,𝐹𝐴 = 𝑃𝑆𝑌𝑆,𝑀𝐷 + ∑
𝑁
𝑖=1 (1 − 𝑞)𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒,𝑖𝑃𝐹𝐴 . (12) 
The probability of catastrophic failure has been evaluated for 
the four configurations of the BALDR UAV defined in 
section 2. Figure 10 shows the probabilities as a function of 
servo MTBF with with the missed detection and false alarm 
rates held at 𝑃𝑀𝐷 = 0.05 and 𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 0.01, respectively. The 
servo MTBF values for the evaluation are chosen so that they 
range from a common R/C-grade servo  to high performance 
ones used on large military UAVs [12]. The MTBF of high 
performance servos for small UAVs, like the ones from [18], 
are approximately 1000 hours, and fall between these bounds. 
The value of 0.05 for the missed detection rate is based on 
industrial values for built-in tests. Specifically, for bulit-in-
tests the missed detection rate is usually estimated by fault 
coverage obtained from Fault Tree Analysis methods. 
Typical values are above 95% [1]  which corresponds to the 
0.05 missed detection rate used in figure 10. It is possible to 
achieve lower missed detection rates using more advanced 
methods, e.g. model-based methods, but this would require a 
more detailed stochastic analysis [8]. The value selected for 
the false alarm rate, 𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 0.01, is assumed to be achievable 
with current fault detection methods. Note that there is an 
inverse relationship between the missed detection and false 
alarm rates. 
  
Figure  10: Probability of failure as a function of servo 
MTBF. 
 
Figure  11: Probability of failure as a function of missed 
detection rate. 
Figure 10 shows that configuration v3 has the lowest level of 
reliability. The probability of failure for v3 is two orders of 
magnitude higher than that of the other designs. This 
configuration has no split surfaces and the ailerons are 
coupled which leaves few possibilities for reconfiguration, as 
can be seen from the allowable ranges. The second-worst is 
v1 despite having 4 servos. Compared to v3, v1 has an extra 
servo that decouples the ailerons, which extends their 
allowable range to [−25∘, +25∘]. This greatly increases the 
reliability of v1 relative to v3. However the elevator range is 
only slightly improved and hence v1 remains the second-
worst design. In fact v1 (with four servos) is less reliable than 
v3 (with 3 servos). This demonstrates that increasing the 
number of servos does not necessarily increase the aircraft 
reliability. Finally, the two most reliable configurations are 
v2 (with four servos) and v4 (with three servos). These 
designs have similar reliability numbers. For low servo 
MTBF v4 is better, but for high MTBF values v2 performs 
better. While using more servos / control surfaces expands the 
allowable ranges, it also adds failure modes to the system. 
When higher quality servos are used, it is beneficial to have 
more servos. This explains why v2 (with four servos) is more 
reliable at high MTBF. On the other hand, when low quality 
servos are used, it is beneficial to have fewer servos. This is 
  
 
why v4 is more reliable at low MTBF. Thus if higher quality 
servos can be used for a UAV, it is worth considering an 
architecture with split surfaces. If only low-cost components 
are affordable, then a simplified design which minimizes the 
number of control surfaces achieves the best reliability. 
Figure 11 shows the effect of missed detection rate. The 
results in this figure are shown for fixed MTBF = 588 hours 
and false alarm 𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 0.01. Configuration v3 has the lowest 
reliability figure, regardless of missed detection rate. For 
missed detection rates near zero, v2 is the best, in fact for 
𝑃𝑀𝐷 = 0 it has 0 probability of failure. This is based on the 
assumption that two servo faults are extremely unlikely and 
thus negligible. For higher missed detection rates, v4 has the 
highest reliability. A similar trade-off can be observed to the 
effect of servo MTBF: if the missed detection rate is low, then 
it is advantageous to have more servos. If missed detection 
rate is high, using fewer servos results in increased reliability. 
If no or only limited performance FDI algorithms are 
available, then an architecture using only a minimal set of 
servos achieves the best reliability. On the other hand, if high-
performance FDI algorithms can be used on a UAV, 
architectures with more than the minimal number of servos 
can be considered. 
6.  Conclusion 
A method has been proposed for assessing the reliability of 
small scale UAVs based on their actuator architecture, 
mission profile and flight control law. The method was 
demonstrated for a specific UAV, for which four actuator 
configurations were assessed. The method can be extended to 
beyond simply comparing different actuator architectures. 
Different airfames can also be compared: for example a 
conventional aircraft with a flying wing. Future work will 
involve assessing the reliability of flying wing airframes with 
several different actuator architectures. The results from this 
research is expected to give valuable insight to small UAV 
designers, so that they can incorporate reliability 
requirements right from the drawing board. 
The proposed method carries the weight of several 
simplifying assumptions. These assumptions can be relaxed 
and the method can be refined. As an example, motor faults 
can be included in the analysis to make it more realistic. 
Another key assumption is that the existence of trim points 
after the onset of a fault is sufficient for reconfiguration. 
Future work will involve the incorporation of the fault 
detection, isolation and reconfiguration into the analysis 
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